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 Abstract 
 Conventional academic studies on political participation mostly focus on electoral politics 
including electoral systems, political party structures and their interaction with other govern-
mental processes. Th ese studies adopt an approach that presumes the existence of a pre-defi ned 
people ( demos ). Hence, existing literature on electoral politics and government structures take 
for granted a pre-defi ned  demos and then survey participatory practices. Yet, there is another way 
to study political participation. It can be studied from the angle of citizenship. Th is involves an 
approach that does not rely on an  ex post facto interest in the activities of a pre-defi ned demos but 
one that unravels the factors that go into its defi nition. Study of political participation from a 
citizenship perspective contains an eff ort to problematize the very notion of  demos . Decoupling 
of national identity and participation empowers a vision of citizenship not as membership in a 
nation-state but as a set of rights that include multi-cultural rights. It is the contention of this 
article that European Union processes have the potential to contribute to the deepening of 
democratization by promoting diversity through introduction of denationalization of citizenship 
as well as processes of deliberation in member and candidate countries. 
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 Introduction 
 In today’s global world, participation can be problematized from two separate 
yet connected angles: First of all, in so far as participation serves the processes 
of democratization it is being divorced from the nation-state. Hence, one can 
 1) Th is article is the revised version of a paper that was prepared for the Middle East Legal 
Studies Seminar at Yale University (January 19–22, 2006). It was written while I was a Visiting 
Scholar at St Antony’s College, Oxford University in fall 2005. I am particularly grateful to 
Kalypso Nicolaidis of Oxford University, whose publications have helped me to make the
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 problematize participation by focusing on its denationalization. Second, as 
a result of the processes of globalization, participation has come to mean more 
than  representation and hence voting in national elections. Th e rising 
 importance of communicative processes involving civil societal organizations 
that function in and across nation-states signals the arrival of a new discourse 
of politics that is based less on power and zero-sum contests and more on 
reason and deliberation. 
 Political partcipation has recently been studied from a citizenship perspec-
tive especially within a literature that focuses on the organization of the 
European Union (EU). Th e fi rst part of this article elaborates on the issue of 
denationalization of participation, using European examples as a prelude to 
the discussions about the Middle East. Th e second part of the article attempts 
to relate patterns of political participation from a citizenship perspective to 
government structures, and reviews the debates pertaining to entrusting the 
masses with political participation in the Middle East. Th e third part elabo-
rates both the notion of denationalization in the Middle Eastern context and 
the notion of deliberative democracy. Th e growth of a literature on delibera-
tive democracy points to the emergence of politics as above and beyond repre-
sentative institutions. Th e denationalization of participation and its increasing 
perception as deliberation are connected processes. In the following pages, 
two questions accompany the discussions pertaining to participation: Who 
are the actors giving shape to the political realm and what type of activity does 
participation contain? 
 1. Denationalization of Participation: European Examples 
 1.1. “We, the People . . .”: What Constitutes the Demos? A Historical Account 
 Modern reality is fragmented by nation-states. Th e political actors who par-
ticipate in the shaping of modern liberal democracies are national citizens. 
Modern citizenship contains civil, political, and economic rights. 2 Th e civil 
 theoretical leap to envisioning political participation from a citizenship perspective. I am also 
indebted to Fuat Keyman of Koç University, Istanbul, who was eager to engage in an inspiring 
exchange of ideas at the earlier stages of my explorations into the recent literature on political 
participation. I am fully responsible for the arguments presented in this article. 
 2) For a description of the evolution of these three dimensions of citizenship, see the widely 
quoted works of T. H. Marshall,  Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1950) and  Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Chicago: 
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dimension of modern citizenship evolved in Europe in the course of the 
eighteenth century through the formation of courts and individual legal rights 
vis-a-vis the absolutist states. Political rights evolved in the course of the 
nineteenth century alongside the evolution of modern parliamentary systems. 
Th e social dimension of citizenship is a phenomenon of the twentieth century 
and is related to the welfare state practices. Th e political actors within the 
nation-states evolved alongside the civil, political, and social dimensions of 
citizenship, albeit not always in that order. 
 Th e sequence of the emergence of the three dimensions of citizenship 
accounts for the diff erent trajectories of nation-state formation. In cases where 
democratization preceded bureaucratization, civil and legal rights acquired 
predominance to the detriment of social rights. In the United States, for 
instance, the notion of  social citizenship became an oxymoron. 3  Th e United 
States citizens relate to the state either via contractual arrangements or aid they 
receive from the state as charity. As a result, it is not uncommon to view the 
recipients of welfare state benefi ts as lazy parasites who are unworthy of 
 citizenship. 4 Despite the diff erences among the various trajectories followed 
towards nation-statehood, the citizens that emerged became the fundamental 
actors participating in modern politics. 
 Modern citizenship involves membership to a nation-state. It evolved along 
the evolution of various nationalisms in Europe in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution. Various defi nitions of  us and  them , refl ected in the concepts of 
 citizen and  foreigner , respectively, emerged in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution. In England, for instance, the 1792 Aliens Bill was a direct response 
to the fl ight of French refugees from France. 5 In America and Switzerland, too, 
immigration control began as a reaction to French revolution and fears that 
Jacobin emissaries had infi ltrated immigrant groups. Th e processes that con-
verted  peasants into  Frenchmen were quickly being exported to the rest of the 
University of Chicago Press, 1977). I discuss Marshall’s rhetoric in relation to the evolution of 
Turkish citizenship in “Can We Envision Turkish Citizenship as Non-membership?” in 
 Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences , ed. E. Fuat Keyman 
and Ahmet Içduygu (London: Routledge, 2005). 
 3) Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship? On the 
Ideology of Contract-versus-charity,” in  Th e Condition of Citizenship , ed. Bart van Steenbergen 
(London: Sage, 1994). 
 4) Typical statements refl ecting this sentiment are presented in Murray B. Levin,  Talk Radio and 
the American Dream (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books/D. C. Heath and Co., 1987), 30–35. 
 5) Richard Plender,  International Migration Law (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff , 1972). 
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 6) Eugen Weber,  Peasants into Frenchmen: Th e Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). 
 7)  Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
world and increasing levels of participation in ways that shaped the contours 
of modern politics. 6 
 Th e French Revolution signalled a connection between the concepts of the 
 nation and  people . Th e nationalist ideology, in so far as it was based on the idea 
of self-determination as the supreme political good, went hand in hand with 
the notion of popular sovereignity. Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804)  argument 
that individuals needed self-detemination in order to be truly human 7 was a 
great source of vitality for nationalism in that it paved the way to an under-
standing that the nations too aspired for autonomy and free will. Th e idea of 
national self-determination empowered the people who constituted the 
nations. As the notions of nationalism and popular sovereignity converged, 
nations became the source of sovereignity and the level of popular political 
particiation increased. Hence, at this point in history, the nation-state and 
political participation did not contradict each other, but rather national iden-
tity, and hence the nation-state, was a precondition for political 
participation. 
 Today, with the increasing importance of global processes, the notion of 
citizenship is becoming divorced from the nation-state. Th e nation-state, 
which once created the conditions for people to enter the political realm and 
determine their own destiny, began to fetter political participation. In fact, 
denationalization of power became necessary in order to widen the base of 
political participation. 
 Th e word  democracy is derived from the Greek roots  demos (people) and 
 kratos (rule). With the arrival of the age of the nation-states following the 
French Revolution, the subject of democracy, the  demos began to be composed 
of national citizens, who acquired the rights to political participation associ-
ated with citizenship, principaly the right to vote in national elections. Today, 
there are various eff orts to widen the boundaries of the  demos in order to 
include those who are not passport-carrying members of the nation-states. 
Th ese eff orts are pursued by various international nongovernmental organiza-
tions, but are also kept on active political agendas of nation-states due to the 
policies of supranational and local administrations. 
 EU residents have the right to participate in elections that are local, regional, 
and Union-wide, but cannot participate in national elections of member 
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 8) Seyla Benhabib, in her powerfully argued and comparatively informative study, maintains that 
“there are three competing models of political incorporation of immigrants into the European 
Union: the German, the French, and the Dutch.”  Th e Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and 
Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 156. 
  9) See, for instance, Hans Kohn,  Prelude to Nation-States, Th e French and German Experience, 
1789–1815 (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967); Rogers Brubaker,  Citizenship and 
Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Ayse 
Kadioglu, “Citizenship, Immigration and Racism in a Unifi ed Germany with Special Reference 
to the Turkish Guestworkers,”  Journal of Economics and Administrative Studies 6, no. 1 – 2 (1992): 
199 – 211. 
countries of which they are not citizens. Hence, for member countries, while 
there is a decoupling of national identity and political participation at the 
local, regional, and Union-wide elections, political rights pertaining to national 
elections remain attached to national citizenship. Within the EU, the bound-
aries of the  demos can best be analyzed by focusing on the legal status of 
immigrants from EU member states and those who are third (non-EU) coun-
try citizens. 8 
 1.2. Changing Conceptualization of  Demos: Is Demos an Ethnos? Th e 
German Case 
 In most countries, national citizenship and political participation are inher-
ently connected. Hence, immigrants must become national citizens via natu-
ralization in order to have the right to vote in national elections. As indicated 
above, EU residents can vote and run for and hold offi  ce at the local, regional, 
and Union-wide elections. Immigrants from countries that are not members 
of the EU (third-country citizens) have no participatory rights unless they 
become citizens via naturalization. EU states have diff erent policies regarding 
naturalization that result in distinct models regarding the incorporation of 
immigrants from non-EU countries. 
 Th e distinction between the French and German nationalisms and respec-
tive policies regarding admission to citizenship has been widely studied. 9 At 
the annual meeting of the International Association of Middle Eastern Studies 
in Berlin (October 4-8, 2000), the keynote speaker Ali Mazrui made a rather 
remarkable observation on this matter. He maintained that in France, a person 
who is Arab is treated as the  other regardless of whether he speaks excellent 
French and has internalized French culture. In Germany, on the other hand, 
an Arab is not even considered fi t to speak excellent German and internalize 
German culture. Hence, he cannot even begin to integrate into the German 
society. Th is distinction sums up clearly the main diff erence between the 
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 10) See, for instance, Rogers Brubaker,  Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany . 
 11) “Introduction,” in  Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America , 
ed. Rogers Brubaker  (  Lanham, NY: University Press of America, 1989), 8. 
French and the German policies regarding admission to citizenship: the for-
mer is assimilationist and inclusive, while the latter is nonassimilationist and 
 exclusive. Accordingly, German citizenship was based on descent (  jus san-
guinis ) until the Citizenship Law of 2000. Th e existing literature accounts for 
the root causes of such distinctions by focusing on France and Germany’s 
respective routes to nation-statehood. 10 
 In Germany, the feeling of nationalism emerged at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, about 50 years before the nation-state was built in 1870, 
and was expressed in a vast Romantic literature. Th is paved the way to an 
emergence of Germanness that is independent of a territory under a state 
sovereignity. Th e result was a deterritorial yet ethnic conception of citizenship. 
Rogers Brubaker refers to this as a “prepolitical German nation.” He argues 
that “[o]n this understanding, ethnic or cultural unity is primary and consti-
tutive of nationhood, while political unity is derivative.” 11 In the French case, 
due to the absence of such a temporal distance between the emergence of 
nationalism and the nation-state, French citizenship evolved on the basis of a 
territorial conception. In sum, in the era of the nation-states, while French 
citizenship placed more emphasis on membership within the state entity, 
German citizenship involved membership within the nation, defi ned as the 
 Volk on the basis of descent. While in France,  demos acquired civic traits, in 
Germany it was defi ned via ethnic bonds, i.e.,  ethnos . 
 Th e eff orts to adopt more civic citizenship legislation in Germany chiefl y 
involved the provincial administration of Schleswig-Holstein. In 1989, the 
provincial assembly of Schleswig-Holstein adopted a law that all foreigners 
residing in the province for at least fi ve years, who possessed a valid residency 
permit, and who were citizens of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, or Switzerland could vote in local and district elections. Th ese six 
states were chosen on the basis of reciprocity. While this law represented a 
move toward decoupling nationality and political participation, the conserva-
tive Christian Democratic Party challenged its constitutionality. 
 On October 31, 1990, the German Constitutional Court struck down the 
law as unconstitutional. It held that “[a]ll state power ( Staatsgewalt ) proceeds 
from the people” and that “[t]he people ( das Volk ), which the Basic law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany recognizes to be the bearer of the authority 
( Gewalt ) from which issues the constitution, as well as the people which is the 
subject of the legitimation and creation of the state, is the German people. 
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 12) Cited in Benhabib,  Th e Rights of Others , 203 – 4. 
 13) Ibid., 204. 
 14) Ibid., 207. 
Foreigners do not belong to it.” 12 Th e court’s decision was based on the 
assumption that the foreigners do not have much at stake in the German 
homeland—“regardless of how long they may have resided in the territory of 
the state, [they] can always return to their homeland” 13 —and therefore should 
not be given the vote. 
 Interestingly, the eff orts of the provincial assembly of Schleswig-Holstein 
that failed due to the ruling of the Constitutional Court became the common 
practice in 1993, when the Treaty of Maastricht, or the Treaty on the European 
Union, established European citizenship, with associated political rights in 
local and regional elections, to all citizens of the then fi fteen signatory states 
who fulfi lled residency requirements in the country in which they wished to 
vote. Of the six states included in the provincial assembly’s initial legislation, 
the citizens of only two, Norway and Switzerland, could not benefi t from the 
Maastricht Treaty since they did not join the EU. 
 Th is example shows how a decoupling of nationality and political participa-
tion was initiated by a provincial assembly, turned down by the German 
Constitutional Court and ultimately realized via an international treaty geared 
towards establishing political unity within the European Community. Th e 
decision about the members of the  demos in local and regional elections in 
Germany was in the fi nal analysis taken at the supranational level. As Benhabib 
notes: “In retrospect, this decision of the German Constitutional Court, 
 written in 1990, appears as a swan song to a vanishing ideology of nationhood.” 14 
In the end,  demos ceased to be defi ned as  ethnos . What was important here was 
that the decision to widen the  demos was not directly taken only by the German 
citizens. It was rather adopted in the form of practices that resulted from 
membership in a supranational entity. 
 In the midst of the debates, there was increasing recognition that Germany 
has become a country of immigration and that people were residing there for 
a long period of time who were neither members of the  ethnos nor strangers. 
Th is recognition paved the way to the development of various forms of non-
citizenship in Germany: 
 •  EU residents: Th ese are citizens of EU member states who—provided that 
they fulfi ll residency requirements—may enjoy political rights at the local 
and regional level. 
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 15) Ibid., 211. 
 16)  Ibid., 208. 
 17) As I have indicated above, current and past naturalization laws in Germany require candi-
dates to renounce their other citizenships before naturalization. Th is prevented many Turks from 
applying for naturalization in Germany since they did not want to lose their rights to reside, 
travel, work, and inherit and own property in Turkey. In Turkey, a new law was issued in 1995 
to address this problem so that Turks who acquired Turkish citizenship by birth and who later 
forfeited their Turkish citizenship by the permission of the Council of Ministers in order to 
acquire citizenship of another country could continue to enjoy residency, travel, work, inheri-
tance, and property rights in Turkey. See Ayse Kadioglu, “Is Racism Being Combated Eff ectively 
in Germany? Th e New Immigration Legislation,” in  Encountering Strangers: Responses and 
Consequences , ed. Goran Rystad (Lund: Lund University Press, 1996). 
 •  Th ird-country citizens: Th ese are citizens of non-EU member states. Th ey 
enjoy no political rights in Germany although naturalization has become 
easier with the new citizenship law (2000)—provided that they forfeit 
the citizenship of their countries of origin. Th ey have been called cohabit-
ants ( Inlander ) 15 and “our co-citizens of foreign origin” ( auslandische 
Mitburger ). 16 
 In Germany, the political participation of third-country immigrants at any 
level still depends on their acquisition of German citizenship. In contrast, 
political participation at the local and regional levels is possible for immigrants 
from EU countries provided that they fulfi ll residency requirements. Only 
German citizens have political rights at the national level. 
 1.3. Is Political Participation Possible in the Absence of National and 
Supranational Identity? 
 Political rights are important dimensions of modern citizenship and are gener-
ally dependent on membership to a nation-state. While in some cases, people 
who settle within the boundaries of nation-states other than their own can 
enjoy dual citizenship, in others, they must forfeit their former citizenship 
before being naturalized. 17 Th e Treaty on the European Union (1993) signifi es 
a major step in the direction of denationalization of citizenship since it enables 
EU residents to participate in local and regional elections in the member 
countries. While this policy promises to denationalize participation at the 
local and regional levels, it also attaches primary importance to membership 
in a supranational entity, i.e. the EU. A similar trend can be observed in the 
United Kingdom where Commonwealth citizens are granted certain voting 
rights. Hence, while participation rights are being divorced from a national 
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identity, they are simultaneously being attached to supranational entities. Th is 
practice excludes third-country nationals who are not from the countries 
that are members of these supranational entities. Th ese people seem to be the 
“lowest of the low” in terms of political rights. 
 Still, there are some cases in Europe where third-country nationals can have 
access to political rights. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden 
grant local and regional election rights to those who have fulfi lled certain resi-
dency requirements. Dutch cities grant city citizenship to all foreigners after 
fi ve years of residency, conferring on them rights to vote, run for offi  ce in city-
wide  elections, and form political parties. Benhabib argues that the acquisi-
tion of these political rights does not remove barriers to free movement within 
the EU. 18 Still,  city-citizens become better represented at the municipal level 
compared to third-country nationals in other EU countries. Ireland and Italy 
grant local but not regional rights. Spain and Portugal grant local and regional 
rights to third-country nationals on a reciprocity basis. 19 Th ese examples sig-
nify a diff erent type of denationalization of participation in the sense that 
certain political rights are granted notwithstanding lack of membership of a 
supranational entity. 
 While regional and supranational agencies increasingly pressing for dena-
tionalization of participatory rights, the national content of  demos is being 
lost. As the boundaries of the  demos widen beyond  ethnos in various countries, 
political reactions with nationalist content have become more visible. 
In Europe, every move towards broadening the  demos has produced nationalist 
reaction. As the concept of the  demos becomes more ecumenical and hollow, 
critics point out the dangers of unrestricted participation. Th e tendency of the 
political analysts and policymakers to underplay participation due to their 
mistrust in the people seems to increase in states in and near the Middle 
East. 
 2. Political Participation and Citizenship in the Middle East 
 2.1. Political Participation and Government Structures in the Middle East: 
Towards a Typology 
 Th ere are at least two ways to study political participation in the Middle East. 
Th e fi rst approach involves examining studies of electoral politics that focus 
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 20) Nils A. Butenschon, “State, Power, and Citizenship in the Middle East: A Th eoretical 
Introduction,” in  Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications , ed. 
Nils A. Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 2000), 4. 
 21)  Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications (Syracuse, New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 2000). 
 22) Nils A. Butenschon, “State, Power, and Citizenship in the Middle East: A Th eoretical 
Introduction” in ibid., 11. 
on electoral systems, political party structures, and their interaction with other 
governmental processes. It presumes the existence of a predefi ned people 
( demos ) and surveys their participatory practices. Th is approach presumes con-
gruence between the modern units of the nation and the state. A second 
approach to the study of political participation is fi rmly rooted in a citizenship 
perspective. Here, rather than an ex-post-facto interest in the activities of a 
predefi ned  demos , the approach involves attempting to unravel the factors by 
which the  demos— the actors within the democratic process—is defi ned. 
Models of political participation are seen as meaningful only when there is an 
agreement as to the identity of the participating actors. Th is problem of who 
is included/excluded in the  demos is of particular relevance in contexts under-
going regime changes since the “point zero in the building of states is not a 
situation where you have a unifi ed people ready to build a state as it sees fi t.” 20 
In fact, the modus operandi of citizenship is the key analytical tool in under-
standing comparative government structures. 
 Problematizing political participation in the Middle East from a citizenship 
perspective involves examining the politics of citizenship as a tool in address-
ing the dynamics of regime formation. Hence, instead of highlighting the 
impact of government structures on levels of political participation, scholars 
following this approach study the citizenship practices that shape the condi-
tions of political participation and thereby shape political regime outcomes. 
Accordingly, citizenship practices are analyzed as phenomena that accompany 
nation and state building processes. 
 Some of the most comprehensive analyses in the fi eld of citizenship studies 
and government structures in the Middle East are contained in a volume 
edited by Nils A. Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian. 21  In the 
volume’s introductory article, Butenschon maintains that citizenship as a con-
tractual relationship “regulates the legal status of the inhabitants of a state (by 
implication including non-citizens) and sets the rules for participation in 
political institutions and access to public resources.” 22 He attempts to produce 
a typology of political organization of states by juxtaposing principles of 
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 citizenship and territorial principles. Th is typology is based on whether the 
organizational principle of the state institutions is based on collective or indi-
vidual membership as well as whether the state allocates rights on a discrimi-
natory or nondiscriminatory basis. Th is paves Butenschon’s way to delineate 
three diff erent ways of constituting a demos in the Middle East: singularism, 
pluralism, and universalism. 
 2.1.1. Singularism 
 In singularist political structures, the state community is constituted on the 
basis of a single and specifi c collective identity. Th is identity can be linguistic 
and ethnic as in the case of Turkish identity in Turkey. It can also be based on 
blood ties or descent as in the case of Jewish state building in Israel. Th e 
Iranian state, too, is based on the single identity of the Islamic  umma (com-
munity of believers). When these singular identity cases become infl uential in 
the formation of unitary states, hegemonic systems result. In such systems, the 
existence and interests of the constituent community are considered to have 
superior moral value. Th e state is not neutral in the way it relates to group 
identities and intergroup confl icts but rather uplifts a singular identity. 
Butenschon identifi es both the Turkish and the Israeli cases as  ethnocracies 
despite the diff erences between them in terms of their methods of discrimina-
tion. He maintains that while the Turkish state seeks to integrate and homog-
enize the entire population of Turkey, the Israeli state is interested in gathering 
Jews in Israel. Th e diff erence bears a resemblance to Brubaker’s distinction 
between two diff erent conceptions of nationhood and citizenship: “It is one 
thing to want to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian, and quite another 
to want to make all Utophiphones citizens of Utopia.” 23 
 Hence, despite the fact that they both resort to discriminatory practices vis-
à-vis individuals and groups who are not members of the singular group, their 
methods of discrimination are diff erent. While the Turkish state is interested 
in the assimilation and homogenization, i.e., the Turkifi cation of  others , the 
Israeli state resorts to nonassimilationist, exclusionary practices. Despite sig-
nifi cant moments of exclusion in Turkey (in the form of population exchange, 
dislocation, and massacre) of non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, there was also room for assimilationist 
practices. Th e Zionist ethnocracy, on the other hand, paved the way to a seg-
regationist policy which is eager to erect institutional, legal, and physical walls 
in order to prevent Palestinians from accessing to land and various other rights. 
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  25) Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy.” 
 26) Arendt Lijphart,  Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Explanation , 149. 
It is important to acknowledge at this point that both nonassimilationist, 
exclusionary policies and assimilationist, homogenizing practices are discrimi-
natory policies and that one type of discrimination is not necessarily better 
than the other. 
 2.1.2. Pluralism 
 According to Butenschon’s aforementioned delineation, in pluralist political 
structures, a national community is composed of separate subgroups, none of 
which are dominant. Th e notion of consociationalism comes to the forefront 
when a plurality of national identities exists in a unitary state. Arend Lijphart 
introduced the notion of consociationalism in 1969 when he maintained that 
a homogenous society was not a necessity in order to avoid instability. 24 He 
advanced this idea by looking at small continental democracies like Holland, 
Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland that had socioculturally fragmented, plural 
structures and yet were stable. Consociationalism contained the idea that 
social stability depended on the management of pluralism. It involved power 
sharing on the part of the elite who represented the plurality of groups. 
 Consociationalism is based on the interplay of plurality of collective groups. 
Th e individuals are accorded a legal status by virtue of being a member of a 
 specifi c group. Hence, their citizenship status is mitigated by the collective 
groups that they are affi  liated with. Lebanon is the primary example of the 
utilization of a consociational idea of power sharing among the elite in the 
Middle East. According to Lijphart, the unwritten National Pact of 1943 
between the Maronite president and the Sunni prime minister signaled the 
beginning of consociationalism in Lebanon. 25 Others argue that the very 
monitoring of membership in the state via such ethnic affi  liations paved the 
way to the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1975. Th e Lebanese case seems 
to have debilitated the strength of the arguments pertaining to plurality cou-
pled with stability. Perhaps it was Lijphart’s preoccupation with stability rather 
than democracy that guided him in declaring the success of consociationalism 
in Lebanon for more than thirty years. 26  Rania Maktabi maintains that the 
principles underlying the National Pact, in fact,  produced an ethnocracy 
rather than a consociational democracy in Lebanon:
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 28) Ibid. 
 As an ethnocracy, the Lebanese regime preferred to rely on control mechanisms – among 
them the politics of citizenship, which monitored membership in the Lebanese state along 
ethnic lines—in order to maintain the prerogatives of the Christian-dominated govern-
ment. Under ethnocractic rule, there developed a peculiar group of stateless persons of 
 predominantly Muslim background who were not welcomed as members of the state. 
Another expression of ethnocractic governance was the prevention of Muslim segments 
from acquiring political representation that corresponded to their relative size within the 
population. Governance in Lebanon was stable, yes, but it was not democratic, as Lijphart 
states. 27 
 Maktabi maintains that the Lebanese  demos were defi ned on the basis of a 
skewed proportionality based on the biased results of the 1932 census. Th e 
demographic changes that have occurred since then call for a political resolu-
tion of the defi nition of  demos in Lebanon via new negotiations. She main-
tains: “Th e prospects for these negotiations are more fruitful—although not 
necessarily less violent—when the identity of the state is not defi ned by the 
ruling elite a priori as it was on the creation of the Lebanese state in 1920.” 28 
 Th ere seems to be a criticism of the idea of a democracy after the defi nition 
of a  demos in her analysis. Th e defi nition of a  demos should accompany the 
process of state building rather than being a frozen phenomenon that precedes 
it. Hence, when a  demos is defi ned prior to the creation of the state in singular 
terms, an ethnocracy inevitably results. Th e critical question that emerges 
from the analysis of political participation from a citizenship perspective then 
becomes the dire need to incorporate the defi nition of a  demos or, better yet, a 
plural, multinational  demos indicated as  demoi into the state-building process. 
 2.1.3. Universalism 
 In Butenschon’s delineation, the principle of universalism takes the individu-
als rather than the collectivity as the main actors within the  demos . Th e indi-
vidual is accorded no special rights due to  membership in a specifi c group. 
Hence, every adult and sane individual is considered equal. When political 
communities are defi ned on the basis of universalist  principles, this defi nition 
is done not ethnoculturally but in territorial terms. Accordingly, all people 
within the jurisdiction of a particular state enjoy equal rights before the law. 
Universalism essentially poses a challenge to the congruence between the 
modern units of the nation and the state. 
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 Th e defi nition of a  demos or people, i.e. an analysis of who is included/
excluded, is one of the most important questions that one encounters in tack-
ling political participation from a citizenship perspective. Th e next crucial 
question involves the extent of power that is to be entrusted with the people. 
 2.2. Trusting or Mistrusting the Masses: Th e Dilemma of Political Participation 
in the Middle East 
 Th e fear of the uncontrolled masses has always concerned political theorists. 
Th omas Hobbes (1588–1679), fearing the life in a stateless society in which 
self-interested human beings are essentially power seeking, defended an abso-
lutist govenment. 29 Any limit to the power of government would cause a 
descent to the state of nature and hence would be undesirable. Hobbes’ rea-
soning had a major impact on conservative thought. Th e fundamental prin-
ciples of classical conservatism stemmed from a disillusionment with the 
chaotic changes prompted by the French Revolution. Both the Hobbesian and 
the classical conservative tradition as expressed in the writings of Edmund 
Burke (1729–1797) contained an eff ort to manage and tame the actions of the 
masses. 30 
 John Locke (1632–1704), on the other hand, envisaged a separation of 
powers of the state that would check and balance one another in order to 
protect the rights of the individuals. 31 In the American context, James Madison 
(1751–1836) became the leading proponent of pluralism since he hoped that 
ambition counteracting ambition would tame the unrestrained power of the 
masses. 32 He advocated federalism, bicameralism, and the separation of  powers 
and checks and balances to prevent the tyranny of the majority. It seems that 
some of the other key inventions pertaining to modern forms of government, 
such as constitutionalism, separation of powers, checks and balances, federal-
ism, and bicameralism, aimed at coping with the tyranny of the majority. 
It was on the basis of such inventions that the idea of representative govern-
ment was produced. 
 Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) argued that the idea of representative 
 government was an impediment to the freedom of citizens. Rousseau was 
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critical of the ideas of the French Enlightenment which sought to explore ways 
to advance liberty via the use of reason. 33 Rousseau thought that “the result of 
the Enlightenment was to make the pursuit of wealth and luxury more impor-
tant than respect for those virtues that secure the common good of the whole 
community.” 34 Rousseau became a staunch critique of the elections and repre-
sentation and advocated direct participation of the citizens in political aff airs. 
He thought that the populace rather than elected offi  cials should be the author 
of the laws that govern them. Rousseau’s views left no room for diversity of 
civil societal groups with diff erent aims in the society, since common good and 
general will would prevail. His emphasis on participation rather than repre-
sentation was accompanied by a staunch defense of the glue of common good-
will and general will that would keep society intact. Hence, while those who 
advocated representative democracy could easily disregard the masses as actors 
in politics, the arguments uplifting participation were reduced by visions of a 
unifi ed general will. 
 Th e duality between representative and participatory democracy has long 
been the major dilemma of democratic theory. While Hobbes, Locke, and 
Burke feared the unrestrained participation of the masses, Rousseau extolled 
participation only when the masses shared a common sense of purpose. 
Rousseau thought that “the tragedy of modern life, embellished by Locke and 
Hobbes, is that our natural moral sentiments are silenced in favor of the values 
that urge us to deny any importance to community and to civic virtue, as we 
extol wealth and  self-interest.” 35 
 Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) built his ideas pertaining to the analysis 
of democracy on the experience of the United States. 36 He placed a lot of value 
on the element of egalitarianism in democracy. Yet he was skeptical of majori-
tarianism and elections yielding their desired outcome of putting power in the 
hands of the wise and the experienced. He warned against the ill-informed 
views and the prejudices of the masses. His thought had a major infl uence on 
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), who argued that although participation should 
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be wide, it should also be unequal. 37 He advocated a system of weighing rather 
than counting votes, in which people with greater abilities would have heavier 
votes. He also provides some examples as to how this would work: “For 
instance, an employer of labor, because he uses his mind, is more competent 
than a common laborer, whereas a foreman is more qualifi ed than an ordinary 
worker, and a banker or merchant more qualifi ed than a tradesman, and 
so on.” 38 
 Th e measures geared towards taming the masses by elevating the power of 
the wise rulers became the basis of a canon of thought known as conservatism. 
Th is canon became irresistably attractive for those who study the processes of 
democratization in the Middle East. One of the most recent, and well-known 
books that is based on such conservative assumptions was  Th e Future of 
Freedom , by Fareed Zakaria. 39 
 Zakaria argues, in line with Tocqueville, that too much democracy may 
harm freedoms just as too much food may harm your stomach. Although 
sharing the fears of Madison, Tocqueville and Mill of the unrestrained masses, 
he also argues that in the absence of a background in constitutional liberalism, 
the introduction of democracy in divided societies can stir up nationalisms, 
ethnic confl ict, and war. Hence, democracy can even be dangerous for the 
preservation of existing liberties in the absence of constitutional liberalism. 
In fact, he fi nds it odd that the United States so often advocates elections and 
plebiscitary democracy abroad. Instead, Zakaria thinks that the real challenge 
is to make the world safe for democracy prior to advocating it. Th is involves 
the development of not only free and fair elections but also the rule of law, 
separation of powers, and the protection of basic constitutional liberties of 
speech, assembly, religion, and property. 
 Zakaria thinks that the elements of constitutional liberalism and democracy 
have always been interwoven in the Western political fabric. However, they 
seem to come apart in other parts of the world. In fact, the pursuit of 
 democracy, in the absence of constitutional liberalism paves the way to  illiberal 
democracies . Th is unwanted result can be remedied by reintegrating constitu-
tional liberalism into the practice of democracy. Zakaria is a fervent advocate 
of the idea expressed by James Madison in  Th e Federalist : “You must fi rst 
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enable—the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige 
it to control itself.” 40 
 Zakaria who is disappointed with the fl ourishing of illiberal democracies in 
the world looked at Iraq in the spring of 2003 and made the following remarks: 
“Order, then liberty. In Iraq today, fi rst establish a stable security environment 
and create the institutions of limited government—a constitution with a bill 
of rights, an independent judiciary, a sound central bank. Th en and only then, 
move to full-fl edged democracy.” 41 
 Robert Kagan referred to Zakaria’s views as an “attack on democracy.” 42 
Kagan argues that “the unique perils of democracy upon which Tocqueville 
long ago speculated—the ‘tyranny of the majority,’ the debasement of the 
culture, the tearing down of elites—are not abstractions for Zakaria, but phe-
nomenon that he experienced fi rst hand as an Indian Muslim growing up in 
Bombay in the 1960s and 1970s.” 43 Kagan continues that, as far as Zakaria, 
the child of Indian elites was concerned, the movement of India away from 
a one-party regime “made India more democratic” but “also made it less 
liberal.” 44 Kagan critically underlines how Zakaria refers to “the great 
unwashed,” i.e. the simple-minded populist masses and short-sighted citizenry 
who pave the way to the dark side of democracy in the absence of the wisdom 
of the elite. 
 Th e diff erent approaches of Zakaria and Kagan on the perils and benefi ts of 
political participation portray the long-unresolved dilemma of liberal democ-
racy. Zakaria speaks positively of the experiences of countries like South Korea, 
Taiwan, Chile, and Singapore. Th ese are countries that fi rst created a strong 
constitutional liberal infrastructure under an economically liberal authoritar-
ian regime prior to holding elections. 
 Zakaria’s views brought the old question of whether to trust or mistrust the 
masses into the center of the democratization processes in the Middle East. 
Th is issue becomes all the more pertinent when political culture and especially 
religion in the Middle East is sometimes viewed as an impediment to democ-
racy. In fact, some analysts refer openly to an incompatibility between Islam 
and some of the preconditions of democratization such as civil society. Ernest 
Gellner, for instance, refers to Islam as the “rival” of civil society and maintains 
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that Islam displays the unique characteristics as a religion in terms of its immu-
nity to secularization. Since secularization is viewed as the only way to gener-
ate liberal individuals who are the  sine qua non of civil society, this view rules 
out the possibility of democracy’s existence in the absence of secularization. 
Th erefore, Islam appears as the “other” or “rival” of civil society. 45 
 Analyses that make religion their central tool in accounting for the demo-
cratic defi cit bring to mind Karl Marx’s well-known expression about religion 
being “the opium of the masses.” In fact, it seems like, in the post-9/11 world, 
religion has become the opium not of the masses but of the elite who seem to 
fi nd an easy relief in blaming Islam for problems of democratization in the 
Middle East. 
 While some refer to Islam as the main impediment to democratization, oth-
ers refer to the political economy of oil and declare that “oil impedes democ-
racy” in the region by leading to states that derive a large part of their national 
income and state revenue from oil production and export. 46 Samuel P. 
Huntington argued that the  third wave of democratization bypassed the 
Middle East since most of the states in the region depend on oil exports which 
in turn enhances the control of state bureaucracy. 47 Other analyses of the 
Middle East focus not on the lack of democratization or the absence of demo-
cratic transition but rather on the authoritarian reproduction of regimes in the 
Middle East. Albrecht and Schlumberger, for instance, maintain that waiting 
for democratization in the Middle East is akin to “waiting for Godot” or wait-
ing for expectations to materialize that were ill-founded from the beginning. 48 
Th ey rather argue that one should focus on the ability of the regimes to change 
without democratization in the Middle East. Th ey maintain that one should 
focus not on the failures of democracy, but rather on the successes of authori-
tarianism via changes  in regime in order to avoid a change  of regime. 
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 Th e literature reviewed above point to the fact that political participation by 
itself cannot be the criterion for measuring democratization in the Middle 
East. Still, some argue that political participation via civil societal organiza-
tions can help inculcating democratic or civic norms of tolerance, trust, mod-
eration, compromise, and accommodation. 49 Cross-national civil societal 
arrangements seem to bring out the  reason in people without making them 
owe an allegiance to a national entity. Hence, they promise to pave the way to 
civic virtue in the absence of a Rousseauesque political community that sacri-
fi ces the individual for the sake of the common good. Th e key questions that 
emerge at this point are: Can there be civic virtue in the absence of an imposed 
common good and can civic virtue be attained via political participation 
itself? 
 For Rousseau, rights did not signify individual freedom in general but rather 
individual freedom within the context of civic virtue. Civic virtue was to be 
derived from the common good of the community that one lives in. Rousseau 
arrived at this notion of civic virtue since he was critical of self-serving 
individualism. He rather celebrated a civic virtue and the upholding of 
community via participation. Still, although he placed a lot of emphasis on 
participation as the basis of civic virtue, his participating citizen was not 
expected to reason and to challenge the common good of the community. 
Rather, a good citizen had the tough will to follow the requisites of the general 
will and was dedicated to the common good of the society. Hence, for 
Rousseau, common good and general will marked the boundaries of political 
participation. In order for political  participation to be instrumental in going 
beyond the self-serving individual and in inculcating civic virtue beyond the 
common good of the community, fi rst the power of reason and especially the 
public use of reason must be valorized. 
 At this point, it seems appropriate to turn to a new approach to democratic 
theory called “deliberative democracy” that is based on Immanuel Kant’s views 
pertaining to the public use of reason. 
 3. From Representation to Political Participation 
 One of the early studies that emphasized participation over representation as 
the core of democracy was undertaken by Carole Pateman in 1970. 50 Th is was 
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followed by other studies focusing on the merits of social activism and civil 
society in transforming state activity. 51 Th rough this literature practices of 
citizenship became critical in democratic processes. In evaluating this change 
of focus in democratization studies, Jean Grugel maintains: “A range of theo-
rists . . . has sought to hold up to the light how patterns of citizenship under-
pin the visible institutional arrangement of politics. In the process, democracy 
was defi ned as the establishment of democratic practices of citizenship, rather 
than the establishment of formal institutions. Th ese debates on participation, 
equality and citizenship constitute a useful way forward for democratization 
studies. Conceptualizing democracy as citizenship avoids the reifi cation of 
institutions that is inherent in empirical democratic theory.” 52 
 While on the one hand, democratic theory ventures into a realm that tran-
scends the realm of the nation-state, at the same time it diverts attention away 
from representative institutions and towards “a network of fairly regulated 
bargaining processes and of various forms of argumentation.” 53 Hence, there 
seems to be two key notions in unravelling new directions in theories of 
democracy: denationalization and deliberation. 
 3.1. Denationalization of Political Participation: Th e Turkish Case  54 
 Most of the new debates on democratization share a fascination about refl ect-
ing beyond the borders of the nation-states. In a world in which the activities 
of global markets and transnational corporations prevail “even the most pow-
erful governments appear impotent” and the “effi  cacy of national democracy 
is called into question.” 55 
 In 1997, after the East Asian fi nancial crash, the International Monetary 
Fund asked both candidates for presidency in the South Korean national elec-
tions to sign a confi dential declaration to stand by the conditions of a  proposed 
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fi nancial rescue package. 56 Moments like these render Robert Dahl’s classic 
question of democratic theory—who governs?—rather irrelevant. 57 Th e EU 
accession processes seem to be the bases of various legislative amendments 
including constitutional changes in various countries. Th e Turkish experience 
of denationalizing political participation seems to be largely prompted by EU 
processes rather than domestic politics. Th e concept of  denationalization dif-
fers from  post-nationalism by virtue of underlining the transformation of the 
national realm. According to Saskia Sassen,  denationalization “has to do with 
the transformation of the national, specifi cally under the impact of globaliza-
tion and several other dynamics, and will tend to instantiate inside the 
national.” 58 Denationalization is still connected to the national realm albeit 
implying new forms of engagement with it whereas post-nationalism makes 
references to European and city citizenship as new forms of citizenship. 
 One of the most popular arguments in Turkey pertaining to the citizenship 
of various identities is that they are all granted citizenship irrespective of reli-
gious and ethnic diff erences. Th is is usually listed among the several “demo-
cratic” aspects of the Republic. What is implied here is that as long as they do 
not mind being under the all-embracing Turkish identity, then, all people of 
diff erent religious and ethnic backgrounds, including the Alevis, Jews, 
Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Circassians, and Assyrians, are conferred the citi-
zenship of the Turkish Republic. Th is is usually viewed as a right in itself. 
Since, citizenship is exclusively viewed as a membership, people who are given 
a ticket to this club are considered to have been decorated with rights. Yet, the 
acquisition of rights does not only involve voting in local, regional, and 
national elections. Participation in political life is above and beyond voting 
rights. It also involves exercising freedoms pertaining to the practice of minor-
ity religious rituals, languages, and cultures. In sum, these are rights about 
being diff erent. Such rights are at the heart of the ongoing process of the dena-
tionalization of citizenship. 
 Some of the most important parliamentary reforms concerning the rights of 
the non-Muslim and non-Turkish Muslim minority groups in Turkey were 
realized as part of the eff ort to join the EU. After Turkey became an offi  cial 
candidate in the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the eff orts to fulfi ll the 
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promised reforms within the National Program which was made public in 
March 2001 were accelerated. Th ere were signifi cant constitutional amend-
ments in 2001 and 2004, as well as various packages containing amendments 
of other legal codes. 59 Th ese constitutional and other amendments broadened 
the scope of languages that people could use to express themselves in their 
daily lives. Th e amendments also lifted the barriers in front of teaching and 
broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. 
 Th ese amendments in legislative processes point to the potential changes in 
the daily lives as well as freedom of expression of the minorities in Turkey. 
Th ey opt for the integration of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish Muslim 
minorities rather than their assimilation into a uniform Turkish culture. Th ey 
promise the adoption of a concept of citizenship that is above and beyond 
membership to a national unit and that embraces human rights. Still, there are 
various problems that are encountered in the course of the implementation of 
these legal changes. Th e diffi  culties that are encountered during implementa-
tion force the legislators to keep passing new laws on language education, 
broadcasting in minority languages in radio and televisions, and property 
rights of the non-Muslim religious foundations. Th e years 2002 to 2005 wit-
nessed an ongoing war of the legislators and the bureaucrats about the imple-
mentation of the amendments. Th e bureaucratic establishment resorted to its 
own rules and procedures in order to delay the implementation of the amend-
ments passed by the parliament. Still, the legal amendments laid the basis of 
the denationalization of citizenship in Turkey, as part of the EU accession 
processes. 
 Turkish experience on denationalization of citizenship, similar to the 
German case, is being accelerated by the EU accession processes. Both experi-
ences  portray the power of the EU processes in transforming citizenship and 
political participation practices despite the ongoing diffi  culties of implemen-
tation. Th e possibility of a nationalist backlash withstanding, the Turkish 
experience at passing legislation with a potential to decouple political partici-
pation and national identity provides a model for the Middle East in general. 
 3.2. Deliberation and Political Participation: “A ‘ Demoicracy ’ in the Making” 
 Henry David Th oreau (1817–1862) once decided to retreat into a cabin by 
Lake Walden, away from other people in order to “live deliberately” as an 
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observer of life around him. Today, “living deliberately” means more than 
that. It means participating in political processes rather than retreating into 
isolation. Deliberation has become a catchword in democratic theory that 
refers to democratic practices that promise to go beyond representation. 
 Th e notion of “deliberative or discursive democracy” was elaborated by 
Jurgen Habermas to describe his opposition to both the liberal and republican 
conceptions of democracy. Habermas argued that both the liberal and repub-
lican notions of democracy centered on a society that is attached to a state. 
He argued that deliberative democracy, on the other hand, is grounded in “the 
image of a decentred society.” 60 Deliberative or discursive democrats are inter-
ested in creating a transnational public sphere of democratic deliberation. 
Th ey uphold various principles towards that end, namely, “non-domination, 
participation, public deliberation, responsive governance, and the right of all 
aff ected to a voice in public decisions that impinge on their welfare or 
interests.” 61 
 Deliberative democracy involves an attempt to go beyond representative 
forms of democracy that presuppose a view of society centered on a state. In 
representative democracies, the  demos is defi ned according to fi xed territorial 
boundaries. Th e notion of deliberative democracy, on the other hand, pre-
sumes a notion of a  demos that is uninhibited by preexisting territorial, cul-
tural or human  boundaries. In deliberative democracy, the focus is on the 
character of political interaction. Hence, deliberative democracy is more pro-
cedural and less substantive. 
 In a groundbreaking article that appeared in  Foreign Aff airs in the winter of 
2004, Kalypso Nicolaidis put forward the notion of  demoi rather than  demos 
as the basis of political participation. 62 She maintains that there are two pre-
dominant views about the EU as an entity: on one hand, there are the inter-
governmentalists who maintain that national sovereignty is the precondition 
of democracy. Hence EU should operate via politicians in Brussels who would 
ultimately be accountable to their electorate at home. Th e supranationalists, 
on the other hand, argue that it is possible to have a European  demos that is 
above and beyond the nation-state. Th ey think a European identity can be 
built on top of national ones. Th ey think that “if civic education in the 1800s 
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could turn peasants into Frenchmen, why could it not now turn them into 
Europeans, or at least into Europeans of French origin?” 63 Supranationalists 
call for a common European fl ag, passport, anthem, and European Prime 
Minister. Th ey envisage a supranational Europe modeled after the nation-
state. 
 Nicolaidis argues that both the intergovernmentalists and supranationalists 
owe allegiance to a version of the nation-state model. She maintains that there 
is a third way to understand Europe, “one that is defi ned not by a uniform 
identity—a  demos— but by the persistent plurality of its peoples – its  demoi .” 64 
Accordingly, she refers to the EU as “neither a union of democracies nor a 
union as democracy” but rather “a union of states and peoples—a ‘ demoicracy ’ 
in the making.” 65 
 Th e “transnational” actors of democracy and the need for democracy’s con-
stant reproduction point to an intersection between denationalization and 
deliberation in democratic theory. Nicolaidis’ analysis points to the increasing 
need to denationalize the  demos while trying at the same time not to give in to 
borders delimited by rigidly defi ned identities. Identities should have porous 
borders. Th e notion of  demoicracy involves an attempt to promote “a commu-
nity of projects” rather than “a community of identity.” Nicolaidis’ notion of 
 demoicracy makes it possible to problematize political participation from the 
angle of citizenship. Hence, denationalization of the  demos and its subsequent 
involvement in deliberative processes are the distinguishing features of a par-
ticipatory democracy that is not only transnational but also above and beyond 
representation. Today, questions of political participation have transcended 
modern nation-states. Th ere is increasing need to reconceptualize political 
participation on the basis not of frozen identities but rather projects that could 
be deliberated across nationalities. 
 In conceptualizing political participation as transnational and beyond 
 representation, one eventually ponders into the question of social unity in a 
society. If we answer, fi rst of all, the question, Who are the people? by pointing 
in the direction of peoples or  demoi that are constantly being defi ned and 
redefi ned, then, the second question becomes “What does the  demoi do in 
order to participate?” Th e answer lies in the participation in deliberative pro-
cesses within civil societal organizations and between them and governments. 
Th is promises to carry democratization beyond the election of representative 
institutions. Th e third logical concern to follow these arguments involves the 
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nature of the glue that keeps the  demoi together and prevents it from disinte-
grating into confl icting units. In analyzing the nature of organization within 
the EU, Nicolaidis, for instance, maintains that “the glue that binds the EU 
together is not a shared identity; it is rather shared projects and objectives. 
Th is distinction is enshrined in the constitution’s very fi rst article, in which 
member states give the EU the power ‘to attain objectives they have in com-
mon’. Th e members’ sense of belonging and commitment to the union is 
based on what they accomplish together, not what they are together.” 66 Th ese 
projects include the single market, the euro, expansion, the promotion of 
peace, social justice, gender equality, children’s rights, sustainable develop-
ment, a highly competitive social market economy, and full employment. 
 Nicolaidis thinks that what binds the peoples of the EU should not be a rig-
idly defi ned European identity such as that taught at schools but should rather 
be the projects that the peoples ( demoi ) share. It is participation via delibera-
tion over these projects that will eventually bind the European  demoi and 
prevent it from disintegrating. 
 Th is view contains a conceptualization of citizenship not as membership in 
a political community but rather as participation in that community. In other 
words,  rather than membership being the basis of participation, participation 
itself becomes the glue that maintains unity among transnational peoples . Th is 
seems to be the very essence of deliberative democracy beyond national 
limits. 
 In an article that appeared in  Newsweek in the aftermath of the riots in Paris 
in November 2005, Fareed Zakaria argued for the need to erect a new identity 
in Europe. He wrote: “Th eory and practice diverge sharply. Europeans claim 
to have given up their old national identities, but have they really? France 
speaks of a republic of values, but scratch beneath the surface and it is a repub-
lic of cloistered communities . . . France and other European countries need 
to move closer to a national identity based on ideas and values.” 67 Zakaria 
thinks it is possible to start from a predefi ned identity based on ideas and 
values. Nicolaidis, on the other hand argues for the “persistent plurality”—as 
expressed in the notion  demoi —of the European peoples. Th is notion signifi es 
a more fl uid glue that should be constantly reproduced via deliberative 
processes. 68 
 66)  Ibid., 103–4. 
 67)  “Europe Needs a New Identity,”  Newsweek , November 21, 2005. 
 68) “We, the Peoples of Europe . . .” 101. 
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 Conclusion 
 Th e notions of denationalization and deliberation are signifi cant in debating 
prospects of political participation in a global world. Approaching political 
participation from a citizenship perspective paves the way to problematizing 
the defi nition of a  demos , the activities that the  demos would undertake, and 
the ways of maintaining the unity of a  demos in the absence of a political 
arrangement based on a congruence of the nation and the state. 
 Th e defi nition of the  demos in a global world not only requires knowledge 
about multinational conceptions of citizenship but also awareness of how 
supranational organizations are gradually rendering national citizenship obso-
lete. Th e German and Turkish examples of denationalization of citizenship 
outlined above point to the EU’s ability to push legislative amendments that 
decouple political participation and national identity. Th ere is still the danger 
that the recent developments in Turkey can be reversed by a nationalist back-
lash. Th e increasing tendency—accelerated by supranational organizations—
towards a global view of citizenship based not on membership in a national 
unit but on a language of rights is countered by reactions of identity groups 
that are formed on the basis of closed notions of ethnicity and religion. We 
live in an era in which citizenship is quickly being divorced from national 
passports despite the fact that religious and ethnic types of discrimination are 
mushrooming everywhere. While the notion of  demos is becoming more ecu-
menical and hollow, the accompanying feelings of powerlessness and political 
apathy point to the danger of a nationalist backlash. People who fi nd it hard 
to function on such slippery ground fostered by globalization processes fi nd 
themselves compelled to embrace closed identity groups. 
 Th e meaning of political participation has changed from voting in elections 
to participation in local, regional, national, and transnational organizations. 
Th e notion of participation via deliberation in transnational organizations is 
replacing the notion of participation via voting for representative institutions. 
Th is has paved the way to a conception of democracy based on the public use 
of reason as opposed to the zero-sum notions envisaged in power politics of 
representative democracy. One of the distinguishing features of Marxism was 
its exaltation of confl ict. Th is had given Marxism its revolutionary potential. 
Th e post-Marxist world has become increasingly interested in the manage-
ment of confl ict. While this has led to the emergence of a discourse of delib-
eration, it has simultaneously given momentum to its own nemesis by 
generating closed religious and ethnic groups that exalt confl ict and violence. 
Th e dialectical choreography of history still seems to linger. 
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 As the meaning of  demos becomes less grounded in national identities, ques-
tions pertaining to the nature of the glue that binds the people come to the 
forefront. In addition to the reemergence of civic republican arguments 
emphasizing a unifi ed common good at the national and supranational levels, 
there also emerges the notion of a  demoi (multicultural peoples) to be persis-
tently reproduced via projects rather than questions of identity. Political par-
ticipation is increasingly becoming deliberation over projects that are geared 
towards holding multinational peoples together. 
